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Pennsylvania's Evolving Judicial
Discipline System: The Development and




Pennsylvania, like many other states, has several formal and
informal methods of imposing disciplinary sanctions on judicial
officers.' Informal methods include persuading an errant jurist to retire
rather than face charges. Formal methods include impeachment2 and
automatic forfeiture of office.3
The 1968 Constitution created another formal method of imposing
disciplinary sanctions: a judicial discipline commission system. Under
the 1968 Constitution, the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board (JIRB)
received and initiated complaints, conducted investigations,4 and held
*B.A., American University, 1982; J.D., Duke University, 1985. Counsel, Legislative Budget
and Finance Committee, Pennsylvania General Assembly. The opinions expressed here are solely
those of the author and do not represent the position of the Committee, its individual members,
or its staff.
1. For a discussion of the various formal and informal methods that states frequently use
to impose discipline on jurists, see RUSSELL R. WHEELER & A. LEO LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED STATES 7-9 (1979).
2. The governor and all other civil officers are liable for impeachment for any misbehavior
in office. PA. CONST. art. VI, § 6. The House of Representatives has the sole power of
impeachment and impeachment trials are held before the Senate. PA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4-5.
Impeachment has rarely been used. "In all of Pennsylvania's long history there have been
but three instances of legislative impeachment since Judge Francis Hopkinson was impeached in
1780. Hopkinson's impeachment was followed by the impeachment of Alexander Addison in
1803, three members of the Supreme Court in 1805, and finally the impeachment of Thomas
Cooper in 1811." THE PREPATORY COMMITTEE TO THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, THE JUDICIARY, REFERENCE MANUAL NUMBER 5, THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTmmONAL CONVENTION 1967-68 60 (1967) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5] (note
omitted). See also ROBERT E. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 431 (1985).
3. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides: "[a]ll civil officers shall hold their offices on
the condition that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction
of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime." PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
In addition, the Pennsylvania Constitution formerly provided: "A justice, judge or justice
of the peace convicted of misbehavior in office by a court, disbarred as a member of the bar of
the Supreme Court or removed under this section 18 shall forfeit automatically his judicial office
and thereafter be ineligible for judicial office." PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(1). This provision was
repealed in 1993, but virtually identical language is now found at PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(3).
See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
4. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(e) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
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hearings when necessary.' The Board could close cases without
disciplinary action, but could not impose disciplinary sanctions; if the
Board found good cause to discipline a justice or judge, it made an
appropriate recommendation to the Supreme Court.6 The Board could
also recommend that a physically or mentally disabled justice or judge
be retired.7 The Supreme Court reviewed each case de novo and could
adopt, modify, or reject the JIRB's recommendation.'
The JIRB system seemed to work well at first and judicial
discipline attracted little attention from the legislature. Judicial scandals
and controversial decisions, however, created interest in the subject. By
1983, legislators were introducing bills to reform the JIRB system.
While those bills did not pass, legislators, lobbyists, and others kept
pressing for reform. Those efforts finally reached fruition in May 1993,
when the voters approved constitutional amendments that changed
Pennsylvania's judicial discipline commission system.
This article will examine the development and content of the 1993
constitutional amendments. Such an examination serves two important
purposes: First, by summarizing (1) the relevant provisions of the 1968
Constitution, (2) the criticisms of that approach, and (3) the responses
adopted in 1993, this article promotes understanding of the new
constitutional provisions. Second, by describing the long and difficult
road to reform, this article explores the politics of judicial reform in
Pennsylvania.
Section II of this Article will describe the decade-long struggle for
reform, and Section III will examine the result of that struggle. Finally,
Section IV will offer a brief conclusion.
II. The Struggle for Reform: Legislation, Litigation and Election
Pennsylvanians may amend their constitution through a three-step
process. First, the General Assembly must pass a bill and the Secretary
of the Commonwealth must publish it in newspapers at least three
months before an election. Second, the General Assembly must pass
the same proposal during the next legislative session, and the Secretary
of the Commonwealth again must publish it in newspapers at least three
5. PA. CONST. art V, § 18(f) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
6. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(g) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993). Throughout this Article the
phrase "Supreme Court" and "Court" refer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, unless otherwise
designated.
7. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
8. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(h) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
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months prior to an election. Finally, the voters must approve the
proposal at a primary, general, or municipal election.9
The drive to amend the constitution's judicial discipline provisions
began in 1983. The General Assembly passed a reform measure in
1990 and 1991, but a court decision kept judicial discipline off the
ballot.'0 A new proposal sailed through the General Assembly in 1992
and 1993, and the voters approved it overwhelmingly in the May 1993
primary.
A. The General Assembly: 1969-1982
The JIRB system seemed to perform effectively at first, as the
Board enjoyed a good reputation nationally as well as in
Pennsylvania." The Board handled few cases 2  and sparked
comparatively little controversy. Consequently, the legislature showed
little interest in judicial discipline.
One of the first incidents that attracted legislative interest in
judicial discipline 13 was a 1979 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision:
Matter of Dalessandro.'4 This case involved a judge accused of
several acts of misconduct, including breaking election laws and having
an affair. The JIRB recommended public censure, but three members
dissented on the grounds that the Board should have recommended
removal. The Supreme Court rejected the Board's recommendation,
deciding not to impose disciplinary sanctions.' 5
The Court disagreed with several of the Board's factual findings.
Additionally, the Court held that the constitution and the Canons of
Judicial Ethics only apply to (1) a judge's conduct in an official
capacity; (2) other conduct that affects the judge while acting in an
official capacity; and (3) conduct prohibited by law.' 6 This decision
9. PA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
10. See Kremer v. Grant, 606 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1992).
11. Special Senate Committee on Judicial Conduct and Administration, The Image of Justice
*.. 32 (1984) [hereinafter Special Senate Committee Report]. Nevertheless, even some of the
early disciplinary decisions drew criticism. See Rhae L. Blynt, Comment, Judicial Discipline -
Does It Exist in Pennsylvania? 84 DICK. L. REv. 447 (1980).
12. In the first years of its existence, the JIRB filed two or three sets of formal charges each
year with the Supreme Court. In 1988, it filed 37 sets of formal charges. Fred Maher, Judicial
Disciplinary Changes Proposed, PA. L.J.-REP., Nov. 21, 1988, at 1. See also WOODSIDE, supra
note 2, at 436.
13. LEGIs. J. No. 44-SENATE, 168th General Assembly, 1984 Sess. 2435 (remarks of Sen.
Stauffer).
14. 397 A.2d 743 (Pa. 1979) (per curiam).
15. Id.
16. Id. Judge Dalessandro was later the subject of another proceeding, In re Former Judge
Arthur D. Dalessandro, 596 A.2d 798 (Pa. 1991) (Flaherty & Papadakos, JJ., dissenting), which
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met with severe criticism,17 but the General Assembly took no action
at this time. According to one lawmaker, the legislature wanted to give
the situation an opportunity to resolve itself.'8
The situation worsened when, in the early 1980s, a Supreme Court
justice was the subject of a JIRB investigation. Justice Rolf Larsen
"had been accused of using his office politically and of unbecoming
conduct, which included making racial slurs about one of his colleagues,
Justice Robert N.C. Nix, Jr.' ' 9  The proceedings were conducted
behind closed doors, and resulted in a decision not to recommend
discipline against the justice.
The Dalessandro and Larsen cases undermined public confidence
in the effectiveness of the JIRB system.2" The cases created the
attracted legislative attention. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HoUSE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1519
(remarks of Rep. Saurman). In the second Dalessandro decision, the court held that a judge who
pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted federal income tax evasion did not commit "misbehavior
in office" within the meaning of Article V, section 18(1) (relating to automatic forfeiture of office).
596 A.2d at 798.
17. Special Senate Committee Report, supra note 11, at iii.
18. LEGIs. J. No. 44-SENATE, supra note 13, at 2436.
19. Special Senate Committee Report, supra note 11, at 32. For a discussion of this
proceeding, see Howard Gibson, Larsen Probe Secrecy Decried, PA. L.J.-REP., June 14, 1982, at
I.
20. Judicial scandals and controversial decisions continued to play a key role throughout the
decade-long struggle for reform, for they continued in a seemingly endless stream during that
period. The controversial decisions included several in cases spawned by the Larsen proceedings.
See First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Adams, Gibbons, Sloviter & Mansmann, JJ., dissenting) (en banc); In re Subpoena on Judicial
Inquiry & Review Bd., 517 A.2d 949 (Pa. 1986); Application of Surrick, 470 A.2d 447 (Pa. 1983)
(Nix & McDermott, JJ., dissenting); First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd.,
460 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1983) (Nix, J., dissenting).
The scandals included a number of widely-publicized cases, such as the O 'Kicki case from
Cambria County and the Fink case from Potter County. For press accounts of these cases, see
JIRB Suspends Cambria Judge, PA. L.J.-REP., Oct. 17, 1988, at 1; Andrew S. Ross, Court
Showdown Looms in Potter Judge Suspension, PA. L.J.-REP., Feb. 9, 1987, at 1; Potter Judge
Denied TRO, PA. L.J.-REP., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1.
The Roofers Union scandal from Philadelphia also attracted considerable attention. For
scholarly discussions of some of the cases that arose from this scandal, see Martina Bernstein,
Judicial Ethics-Uncertain Standard for Determination of Legitimacy of Receipt of Gift to
Pennsylvania Judges-Matter of Braig, 520 Pa. 409, 554 A.2d 493 (1989), 63 TEMP. L. REv. 425
(1990); Jacquelyn J. Fatula, Judicial Conduct-Varying Use of Substantive Evidence and Standard
for Determining Proper Gift-In re Chiovero, 524 Pa. 181, 570 A.2d 57 (1990), 64 TEMP. L. REv.
299 (1991).
Perhaps the most widely-publicized scandal involved several members of the Supreme
Court. In December 1992, the Supreme Court, by a two-to-one vote, publicly reprimanded Justice
Larsen for contacting an Allegheny County judge about a case before her. Matter of Larsen, 616
A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 65 (1993). See also Justices Reject
Appeal of Larsen Reprimand, PA. L.J., Oct. 11, 1993, at 8. Justice Larsen responded by accusing
Justices Zappala and Cappy of various acts of misconduct, including commandeering a car and
trying to run him down with it. Attorney General Ernest D. Preate, Jr. initiated an investigation
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impression that judicial misconduct was being swept under the rug.
Limited public information about Board proceedings compounded this
impression.2' The resulting crisis in public confidence22 gave birth
to the reform movement.23
B. The General Assembly: 1983-84 Session
Legislators responded to the Dalessandro and Larsen cases with six
bills and one resolution addressing judicial discipline. The bills took
several forms. One bill 24 was a two-page proposal that would have
modified the composition and powers of the JIRB. Two other bills
25
proposed extensive changes in the JIRB system. The three remaining
bills called for changes throughout the Judicial Article.26
The Senate passed one reform bill27 by a vote of 47 to 0. Some
senators later questioned the bill's impact on the separation of
which resulted in indictments against Larsen in late October 1993. Lisa Brennan, Grand Jury
Charges Larsen in Prescription Drug Scheme, PA. L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 1. Some persons also
called for disciplinary action against the justice. Peter J. Shelly, Larsen Object of Another Probe,
THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct. 30, 1993, at B8. In addition, the House of Representatives
instituted an investigation that may lead to impeachment proceedings. Peter J. Shelly, House OKs
Own Probe of Larsen, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov. 24, 1993, at Al.
These scandals and decisions helped maintain legislative interest in judicial discipline. They
provided motivation for change, LEGIS. J. No. 17-SENATE, 170th General Assembly, 1986 Sess.
1779 (remarks of Sen. Lewis), and identified problems that needed to be resolved. Moreover, they
created pressure on the legislature because constituents reacted to these judicial scandals and
controversial decisions by contacting their legislators and demanding change. See, e.g., LEGiS. J.
No. 3-HoUSE, 177th General Assembly, 1993 Sess. 54 (remarks of Rep. Kukovich); LEGIS. J. No.
19-SENATE, 168th General Assembly, 1984 Sess. 1953-1954 (remarks of Sen. O'Connell). Judicial
scandals and controversial decisions were a blessing in disguise in that they galvanized support
for reform. LEGIS. J. No. 11-SENATE, 175th General Assembly, 1991 Sess. 161 (remarks of Sen.
Jubelirer). See also Lisa Brennan, Larsen Charges Against Colleagues Prompt New Calls for
Reform, PA. L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at I (spokespersons for the governor and a state senator agree that
the crisis surrounding the Supreme Court in late 1992 could promote final passage of a judicial
discipline bill).
21. For a discussion of the rules on confidentiality, see infra notes 175-78 and accompanying
text
22. Even the JIRB's executive director acknowledged the lack of public confidence in the
system. He said "perhaps there is a lack of confidence that there are mechanisms in place to
resolve those problems that have to be resolved." Andrew S. Ross, Keuch Explains JIRB Role,
PA. U.-REP., Sept. 1, 1986, at I.
23. Perhaps the most important goal of the reform movement was to restore public
confidence in the judicial discipline commission system. See, e.g., LEGIs. J. No. 6-HousE, 175th
General Assembly, 1991 Sess. 92 (remarks of Rep. DeWeese).
24. H.R. 1895, 1984 Sess.
25. H.R. 1319, 1983 Sess.; H.R. 1996, 1984 Sess.
26. S. 792, 1983 Sess.; S. 1100, 1983 Sess.; H.R. 846, 1983 Sess.
27. S. 1100, 1983 Sess.
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powers,2" causing the Senate to pass a modified version of the bill.29
Neither bill came up for a vote in the House.
The General Assembly did not pass a reform bill during the 1983-
1984 session. The Senate, however, passed a resolution calling for a
special Senate committee to study several issues relating to the
judiciary. 0 One such issue was the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial
Conduct.
The Committee submitted a report in November 1984
recommending numerous changes. Some of these recommendations did
not require constitutional amendments. For example, the Committee
recommended that the legislature provide the JIRB with an adequate
budget.3 ' Some Committee recommendations, however, did require
constitutional amendments. These called for: (1) establishing an
independent judicial discipline board with the authority to remove
judges from office; (2) changing the disciplinary board's composition
to reduce the influence of judges; (3) reducing "the ability of any one
appointing authority to hamper the effectiveness of the board by failure
to make appointments in a timely fashion;"3 2 and (4) opening board
proceedings to the public after the preliminary investigation stage.33
The Committee released its report in the closing days of the 1983-
1984 legislative session. Consequently, legislators could not introduce
bills to implement the Committee's recommendations. Those
recommendations, however, provided a starting point for bills during the
1985-1986 session.
C. The General Assembly.- 1985-1986 Session
Legislators introduced five reform bills during the 1985-1986
session.34  While the Senate passed one of these bills, 35 the House
failed to vote on any of them. The Senate then amended a bill that had
28. LEGIS. J. No. 44-SENATE, 168th General Assembly, 1984 Sess. 2431 (remarks of Sen.
Stauffer).
29. H.R. 846, 1983 Sess.
30. S. Res. 54, 1983 Sess.
31. Special Senate Committee Report, supra note 11, at 40-41. At the time, JIRB had a
budget of about $300,000 a year. Although this was the third largest budget in the nation for a
judicial disciplinary commission, the Board had a small staff. Id. at 30-31. The Board did not
even have a full-time prosecutor until 1986. Ross, supra note 22, at 1.
32. Special Senate Committee Report, supra note 11, at 40. During most of 1984, the Board
had two vacant positions. Governor Thornburgh had exclusive authority to fill those positions.
33. Id. at 39-40.
34. See S. 1, 1985 Sess; S. 842, 1985 Sess; H.R. 489, 1985 Sess.; S. 1504, 1986 Sess.; H.R.
1451, 1986 Sess.
35. S. 1, 1985 Sess.
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already cleared the House36 by deleting everything in the bill and
substituting provisions concerning judicial discipline. The House,
however, never considered the amended version of the bill.
Why did reform bills repeatedly clear the Senate but not the
House? The answer may lie in the different opinions of persons in
leadership positions. The Senate Majority Leadership clearly supported
reform. Senator Robert C. Jubelirer (then Majority Leader) and Senator
John Stauffer (then Majority Whip) each offered reform proposals
during the 1983-1984 session,"3 and Senator Stauffer (who became
Majority Leader) introduced another reform measure during the 1985-
1986 session.3  The House leadership, in contrast, did not support
reform; advocates of reform claimed that Representative James J.
Manderino (then Majority Leader) blocked reform measures.39
During both the 1983-1984 and the 1985-1986 sessions,
Republicans formed the majority party in the Senate and Democrats
formed the majority party in the House of Representatives.
Nevertheless, leadership differences on judicial discipline did not divide
along party lines.4' The differences reportedly stemmed from
geographical factors. Representative Manderino, unlike the majority
leadership in the Senate, represented a district in western Pennsylvania.
According to one advocate of reform, "it appears there is some reason
why they feel they have to be defensive in terms of the western
Pennsylvanians who sit on the Supreme Court . . . . It's a defensive
action on their behalf."' Whatever the reason for Representative
Manderino's opposition, a reform measure would not pass the House as
long as he was Majority Leader.
36. House Bill 260 of the 1985 Session, which concerned tax exemptions for the surviving
spouse of a veteran.
37. Senator Jubelirer introduced Senate Bill 1100 in the 1983 Session; Senator Stauffer
introduced Senate Bill 792 in the 1983 Session, plus judicial discipline amendments to House Bill
846 in the 1983 Session.
38. S. 1, 1985 Sess.
39. Ross, supra note 22, at 15.
40. Legislators seemed intent on keeping partisan politics out of the debate over judicial
discipline; they constantly stressed the bipartisan support for reform legislation. See, e.g., LEGIS.
J. No. I l-SENATE, 175th General Assembly, 1991 Sess. 165, 166 (remarks of Sen. Mellow);
LEGIS. J. No. 48-SENATE, 174th General Assembly, 1990 Sess. 2433 (remarks of Sen. Jubelirer);
LEGIs. J. No. 73-HOUSE, 173rd General Assembly, 1989 Sess. 1991 (remarks ofRep. DeWeese).
41. Ross, supra note 22, at 1.
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D. The Beck Commission: 1987-1988
The political scene in Harrisburg changed in January 1987 when
Robert P. Casey succeeded Richard Thornburgh as governor.42  Six
months after his inauguration, Governor Casey appointed a Judicial
Reform Commission to "examine issues related to the judicial branch
and to recommend such changes in law and procedure as it finds
advisable." ' Superior Court Judge Phyllis W. Beck chaired the group,
which became known as the Beck Commission.
The Commission's January 1988 report focused on four areas: (1)
administration and utilization; (2) judicial discipline; (3) finance; and (4)
judicial selection and retention. The Commission offered several
recommendations for changing the JIRB system. Like the special
Senate committee of 1983-1984, the Commission recommended some
changes that did not require constitutional amendments. Most of the
Commission's recommendations, however, required constitutional
amendments to become effective. Among other things, the Commission
recommended: (1) dividing the JIRB system into two parts, an
investigative division in the executive branch and an adjudicative
division in the judicial branch; (2) empowering the adjudicative division
to impose discipline subject to judicial review; and (3) reducing the
confidentiality of disciplinary proceedings."
The legislature quickly responded to the Commission's
recommendations. Senator Greenleaf introduced the first bill
incorporating many of the Commission's recommendations 45 four
months after the Commission released its report. While the Senate
passed that bill, the House did not vote on it.
The Commission's report also had a swift impact outside of the
legislature. In November 1988, a panel sponsored by the
Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts issued a report with
recommendations that were "closely aligned" with those proposed by
the Beck Commission.46 Former Superior Court Chief Judge Edmund
B. Spaeth, Jr., the co-chair of the Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts,
explained that the group's "main concern [was] to get the Legislature
42. Interestingly, both men attended the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention that established
the JIRB system.
43. Exec. Order No. 14 (July 16, 1987).
44. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S JuDiIAL REFORM COMMISSION 29-34 (1988) [hereinafter
BECK COMMISSION REPORT].
45. S. 1399, 1988 Sess.
46. Maher, supra note 12, at I.
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to consider these changes now. ' The General Assembly ultimately
considered many of the Beck Commission's recommendations because
those recommendations provided the model for several reform bills.4"
E. The General Assembly: 1987-1988 Session
The 1987-1988 session of the General Assembly was similar to the
two previous legislative sessions in several respects. Again, several
reform bills were introduced.49 Again, the Senate passed reform
proposals" while the House did not. Again, advocates of reform in
the Senate tried to amend a House-passed bill by deleting everything in
the bill and substituting provisions concerning judicial discipline.5
This time, however, the Senate defeated that proposal.
The drive for reform failed to achieve a breakthrough by the end
of 1988, yet the reformers' tactics are noteworthy. Reformers were
persistent;" they introduced bills session after session, including bills
that previously had failed. Senate Bill 1, Senate Bill 2 and House Bill
835 of the 1987-1988 legislative session closely resembled bills that had
failed during the previous legislative session.53 The reformers were
also willing to compromise, to adopt others' recommendations in order
to achieve success. For example, Senator Greenleaf, who introduced
Senate Bill 2, also introduced Senate Bill 1399, which was the first bill
47. Id. at 1, 10.
48. See, e.g., LEGIS. J. No. 23-SENATE, 173rd General Assembly, 1989 Sess. 422 (remarks
of Sen. Lewis) (referring to S. 595, 1989 Sess.); Tom Troy, Judicial Discipline Bill Gets Final
Nod, PA. L.-REP., Feb. 18, 1991, at I (referring to H.R. 1, 1991 Sess.).
49. S. 1, 1987 Sess.; S. 2, 1987 Sess.; HK 835, 1987 Sess.; H.R. 1035, 1987 Sess.; S. 1399,
1988 Sess.
50. S. 1, 1987 Sess.; S. 1399, 1988 Sess.
51. H.R. 40, 1987 Sess. The House-passed version of the bill proposed a constitutional
amendment allowing the General Assembly to make special tax exemptions for homestead
property.
52. Several legislators were particularly persistent Senator Stauffer offered reform proposals
in three consecutive legislative sessions. See S. 792, 1983 Sess.; S. 1, 1985 Sess.; S. 1, 1987 Sess.
Representative Lois Sherman Hagarty introduced reform bills in five straight legislative sessions.
See H.R. 1319, 1983 Sess.; H.R. 489, 1985 Sess.; H.K 835 and H.R. 1035, 1987 Sess.; H.IL 846,
1989 Sess.; H.R. 2341, 1992 Sess. Representative Hagarty also attempted to amend House Bill
1130 (1985 Sess.) to include provisions concerning judicial discipline, but the House found that
the amendment violated the constitutional prohibition against bills containing more than one
subject LEGIS. J. No. 66-HOUSE, 169th General Assembly, 1985 Sess. 1983. Finally, Senator
Stewart Greenleaf introduced seven reform bills from 1985 to 1993. See S. 842, 1985 Sess.; S.
1504, 1986 Sess.; S. 2, 1987 Sess.; S. 1399, 1988 Sess.; S. 595, 1989 Sess.; S. 1000, 1991 Sess.;
S. 186, 1993 Sess.
53. Senate Bill 1 (1987 Sess.) and House Bill 835 (1987 Sess.) were very similar to Senate
Bill 1 (1985 Sess.) which passed the Senate but died in the House. Senate Bill 2 (1987 Sess.) was
virtually identical to Senate Bill 1504 (1986 Sess.) which died in the Senate Appropriations
Committee.
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to incorporate the recommendations of the Beck Commission.54 The
Senate passed the latter bill, but the House never voted on it.
Reformers failed to overcome the opposition between 1983 and
1988. Partly because of changes in the House leadership, reformers
would finally taste success during the 1989-1990 legislative session.55
F. The General Assembly: 1989-1990 Session
The 1989-1990 legislative session differed from its predecessors in
several respects. Advocates of reform in the Senate adopted a novel
strategy for passing a bill through the General Assembly: having the
Senate pass two very different bills in hopes that the House would pass
one of them.56 The entire Senate went along with this approach and
passed both bills" in early 1989.
In the House, the 1989-1990 session witnessed a changing of the
guard in the majority leadership. Representative K. Leroy Irvis, who
had been Speaker since January 1983, retired after the 1987-1988
legislative session. Representative Manderino became Speaker and
Representative Robert W. O'Donnell of Philadelphia became Majority
Leader. Representative H. William DeWeese, who represented portions
of Greene, Fayette, and Washington Counties, became Majority
Whip.
58
The significance of these changes quickly became apparent.
Although Representative DeWeese, like Representative Manderino, held
a seat from western Pennsylvania, the new Majority Whip supported
reform of the JIRB system. His reform bill,59 introduced in February
54. S. 1399, 1987 Sess.
55. The House and Senate leaderships' support of reform measures was no doubt an
important factor in the ultimate success of the reform movement. Another important factor was
widespread public support for change. As Judge Beck stated, "I [do not] see reform going
anywhere unless we have the grassroots support of the citizens of the state." Maher, supra note
12, at 10.
Yet another important factor was the work of interest groups. The Pennsylvanians for
Modem Courts, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, the Philadelphia Bar Association, and Common
Cause were just a few of the groups that lobbied for reform.
56. LEGIS. J. No. 23-SENATE, 173rd General Assembly, 1989 Sess. 423 (remarks of Sen.
Brightbill); Id. at 427 (remarks of Sen. Jubelirer).
57. Senate Bill 1 of the 1989 Session proposed a judicial discipline commission system in
which one agency investigated and adjudicated complaints against judicial officers. Senate Bill
595 of the 1989 Session proposed a system in which one agency performed investigatory and
prosecutory functions and another agency performed adjudicatory functions.
58. Significantly, Representative DeWeese had supported reform measures as Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee. LEGIs. J. No. 47-HOUSE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1517
(remarks of Rep. Piccola).
59. H.R. 539, 1989 Sess.
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1989, was the first reform proposal introduced by a member of the
House majority leadership team. It passed the House on December 5,
1989. The vote on final passage was reconsidered, however, and the
bill hung in limbo for several weeks.
As of December 1989, legislators had introduced four reform
bills.6° Two bills passed the Senate, but all failed to pass the House.
Unfortunately, Speaker Manderino passed away on December 26, 1989
and Representative O'Donnell subsequently became Speaker and
Representative DeWeese became Majority Leader.
In January 1990, the House acted on procedural motions
concerning Representative DeWeese's bill, but the General Assembly
took no further action on reform bills for several months. The logjam
finally broke in the summer of 1990 when the House passed two bills
to reform the judicial discipline system. An amended version of
Representative DeWeese's bill passed the House on June 11, and an
amended version of a Senate bill passed the House on June 30. The
Senate concurred in the House amendments to the latter bill, and Senate
Bill 1 became Joint Resolution 1 of 1990.61 Thus, the first stage in the
constitutional amendment process was complete.
G. The General Assembly: 1991, Stage II of the Amendment
Process
Legislators wasted little time in moving to the second stage of the
constitutional amendment process. Representative DeWeese introduced
House Bill 1 on January 30, 1991. The bill was not exactly the same
as Joint Resolution 1 of 1990, so the House amended the bill to make
the two measures identical. The bill then passed by a vote of 198 to
0.62
One prominent senator criticized the House's handling of the bill.
He claimed that "this bill came to us in the middle of the night on the
29th of June in a trade for a vote on the State Song, [and] an
amendment was stuck in the House by a Member who was in Russia at
60. S. 1, 1989 Sess.; S. 595, 1989 Sess.; H.R. 539, 1989 Sess.; H.R. 846, 1989 Sess.
61. Joint Resolution I of 1990 proposed extensive changes in the judicial discipline
commission system. In addition, it included provisions concerning financial disclosure by judges
and a section addressing the financial affairs and budgets of the unified judicial system. See S.
1, 1989 Sess.
62. H.R. 1, 1991 Sess.
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the time. 6 3 That senator voted against the bill, but he was the only
one; the Senate passed House Bill 1 on February 12, 1991."
The General Assembly had passed the same judicial discipline
measure in two consecutive sessions, so only one step remained in the
constitutional amendment process: passage by the citizens of
Pennsylvania. The measure was scheduled to be on the ballot in the
May 1991 primary. Unfortunately, the people would never have an
opportunity to vote on the proposal.
H. The Kremer Case
Several persons filed lawsuits challenging the ballot question on
judicial discipline. Interestingly, the plaintiffs included a former
president of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, the president
of the state Teamsters Union, and two court of common pleas judges.65
The cases were consolidated, and on April 1, 1991, Commonwealth
Court President Judge David W. Craig enjoined the ballot question on
judicial discipline." Among other things, he found that the legislature
had improperly delegated authority to the Secretary of the
Commonwealth to determine when the question would appear on the
ballot. He further determined that the Secretary of the Commonwealth
had failed to properly advertise the proposal in 1990.67
Judge Craig's ruling "was stayed automatically when the state
appealed the decision but [he] lifted the automatic stay and the Supreme
Court ... refused to reinstate [it]."68 This ruling effectively killed the
ballot question.69 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Judge
Craig's decision almost one year after the 1991 primary.70
I The General Assembly: 1992
The Kremer case moved "proponents of judicial reform 'back to
square one."' 7 Leading reform advocates disagreed over the best way
63. LEGIS. J. No. 11-SENATE, 175th General Assembly, 1991 Sess. 164 (remarks by Sen.
Fumo).
64. H.R. 1, 1991 Sess.
65. Mark Tarasiewicz & Hugh Bronstein, JudicialAmendment Down for the Count, PA. L.J.-
REp., Apr. 8, 1991, at 1.
66. Judge Craig's decision was not published. For a discussion of the decision, see Kremer
v. Grant, 606 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1992); Tarasiewicz & Bronstein, supra note 65; Mark Tarasiewicz,
Judicial Referendum Killed by High Court, PA. L.J.-REP., Apr. 15, 1991, at 1.
67. Kremer, 606 A.2d at 433.
68. Tarasiewicz & Bronstein, supra note 65, at 1.
69. Id.
70. Kremer v. Grant, 606 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1992).
71. Tarasiewicz & Bronstein, supra note 65, at 1 (quoting Robert R. Gentzel, a spokesperson
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to proceed, causing tension in the reform movement. For example,
some advocates of reform drafted a proposal responding to the Kremer
decision,72 which others believed conceded too much to the Supreme
Court.73 Consequently, legislators responded to the Kremer decision
by introducing three separate bills.74
Of these bills, Senate Bill 1000 became the vehicle for reform.
After spending eleven months in the Senate Judiciary Committee, the
bill made rapid progress through the General Assembly. The Senate
passed one version of the bill on May 5, 1992, and the House passed
another version on June 24. On July 1, the Senate concurred in the
House amendments.75 The first stage in the constitutional amendment
process was thus complete for a second time.
J. The General Assembly: 1993
Legislators introduced three reform bills in January and February
of 1993. One of these bills76 called for a constitutional convention to
revise Articles V and XI of the 1968 Constitution. The other two
bills77 were identical to Joint Resolution I of 1992. House Bill 1,
introduced by now Speaker DeWeese, sailed through the General
Assembly.
The House and Senate passed the bill in time for a judicial
discipline question to appear on the ballot in the May 1993 primary.
During the House debate, however, several legislators expressed
concern that another lawsuit would be filed to keep the issue off the
ballot.7" Their concerns proved well-founded.
for the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office).
72. Mark Tarasiewicz, New Judicial Discipline Bill Floated Among Lawmakers, PA. L.J.-
REP., Jan. 6, 1992, at 1.
73. Id. at 11. See also Mark Tarasiewicz, Judicial Reform Proposals Introduced in
Legislature, PA. L.J.-REP., Feb. 3, 1992, at 1.
74. S. 1000, 1991 Sess.; H.R. 2341, 1992 Sess.; H.R. 2491, 1992 Sess.
75. Joint Resolution No. 1 of 1992, like Joint Resolution No. 1 of 1990 proposed extensive
changes in the judicial discipline commission system. Unlike the earlier measure, however, Joint
Resolution No. I of 1992 did not include provisions concerning financial disclosure by judges, nor
did it include a section on the financial affairs and budgets of the unified judicial system. Joint
Resolution No. I of 1992 was also unlike its predecessor in that it addressed the compensation of
judicial officers who were removed or suspended.
76. S. 396, 1993 Sess.
77. H.R. 1, 1993 Sess.; S. 186, 1993 Sess.
78. See, e.g., LEGIS. J. No. 4-HousE, 177th General Assembly, 1993 Sess. 57 (remarks of
Rep. Caltagirone); Id. at 58 (remarks of Rep. McNally).
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K The Reil Case
William Reil, a spokesman for the group Victims of a Corrupt
Legal System, filed suit to prevent the judicial discipline question from
appearing on the May 1993 primary ballot. Among other things, Reil
argued that the amendment violated the state and federal constitutions
"because it would give some judges and other government officials
absolute immunity while performing their duties."'79 Reil also filed a
petition accusing several officials (including the governor, the lieutenant
governor, the attorney general, and the secretary of the Commonwealth)
of treason, racketeering, obstruction of justice, fraud, abuse of power,
and corruption. °
The Reil case, like the Kremer case, was decided by
Commonwealth Court President Judge David W. Craig. Judge Craig
dismissed Reil's suit on April 30, 1993 s' and the Supreme Court
affirmed this decision on May 14, 1993.82 The proposed changes in
the JIRB system therefore were submitted to the voters in the May 1993
primary election.
L. The May 1993 Primary
The advocates of reform did not assume that the voters would
automatically approve the proposed changes in judicial discipline.
Groups supporting the measure (including the League of Women
Voters, the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and Pennsylvanians for
Modern Courts) 3 worked to generate popular support for the measure.
Their efforts included writing editorials 4 and holding a series of news
conferences around the state to generate support for the measure. 5
79. Joseph Coleman, Suit Targets Amendment on Disciplining of Judges, THE PATRIOT
(Harrisburg, Pa.), Apr. 16, 1993, at B3.
80. Joseph Coleman, Court Asked to Kill Referendum, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Apr.
23, 1993, at B4.
81. Judge Craig's decision was not published. For a discussion, see Judicial Reform Measure
Stays on Ballot, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 1, 1993, at A3.
82. Reil v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 625 A.2d 611 (1993) (per curiam) (Papadakos,
J., dissenting).
83. Carmen Brutto, Judge Discipline is Issue, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 16, 1993,
at B4.
84. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., et al., Issuing a Call to Arms, PA. L.J., May 17, 1993, at 2. See
also Diane Doyle, On Disciplining Judges, PITT. POST-GAZErrE, May 3, 1993, at D2 (editorial by
the President of the Allegheny County Council of the League of Women Voters).
85. Mark A. Tarasiewciz, New Judicial Discipline System by August, PA. L.J., May 24, 1993,
at 1.
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While certain prominent public officials, including Governor
Casey,86 and various newspapers87 supported the measure, it did not
enjoy unanimous acceptance."8 The Pennsylvania Commission for
Better Justice (chaired by Cyril E. Sagan, a chemistry professor at
Slippery Rock University) paid for billboard advertisements stating
"Shall judges become emperors? On Judicial Question: VOTE
NO!"8 9  Common Cause, which had supported the judicial discipline
measure in the General Assembly, opposed it in the primary. A
spokesperson explained that Common Cause had concluded that "the
current proposal [is not] strong enough to make a real difference."'
On election day only 19.1 percent of the state's registered voters
cast ballots on the judicial discipline proposal.9' The measure passed
with ease: 928,932 people voted for it, while 200,908 people voted
against it.92  Finally, judicial reformers completed the three-step
process of amending the constitution.
M The 1993 General Assembly: Implementing Legislation
Just one month after the voters approved the judicial discipline
proposal, legislators introduced two additional bills designed to reform
the judicial discipline system.93 Both measures called for a limited
constitutional convention to amend Article V. The legislature referred
these bills to committee, where they remained as of November 25,
1993.
House Bill 699, in contrast, quickly marched through the
legislature. The House-passed version of the bill94 dealt with the
Commonwealth's portion of fines. After the Senate Appropriations
Committee added provisions implementing the constitutional
amendments on judicial discipline, 95 the Senate passed the amended
86. Casey Urges 'Yes' Vote on Judicial Discipline, PA. L.J., May 3, 1993, at 11.
87. See, e.g., Lawyers on Parade, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 3, 1993, at A14 (editorial);
Judicial Reform, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 12, 1993, at A8; Reform Judicial Discipline,
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), May 16, 1993, at A24.
88. See, e.g., Hrubovcak, Defeat Judicial Reform, Pinr. POST-GAZETTE, May 16, 1993, at
AA-3 (editorial).
89. From Voting Booths to Billboards: Local Election Scenes, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg,
Pa.), May 19, 1993, at B3 (emphasis in original).
90. Susan Mitchell, All a Mirage?, PA. L.J., May 10, 1993, at 2.
91. Out of 5,902,001 registered voters, only 1,129,840 cast ballots on the judicial discipline
question. The People Have Spoken? A Few Did, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), May 20, 1993,
at B4.
92. Id.
93. H.R. 1843, 1993 Sess.; H.R. 1938, 1993 Sess.
94. H.R. 699, 1993 Sess.
95. Id.
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bill on June 22, 1993. The House concurred in the Senate amendments
on June 23, 1993. Lieutenant Governor Mark Singel, who became
acting governor shortly before Governor Casey had a heart-liver
transplant in June 1993, signed the bill into law on July 2, 1993.96
N. Subsequent Developments
Pursuant to the 1993 amendments, the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board was dissolved on August 16, 1993. 9' The new judicial
discipline commission system only existed on paper at that time because
no one had yet been named to the new disciplinary bodies. 9 The
Supreme Court named its appointees on August 27,99 and Acting
Governor Singel named his appointees on October 25.'00 The
members of the Judicial Conduct Board were sworn in on November
5,"01 and the members of the Court of Judicial Discipline were sworn
in on November 23."02 At that point, Pennsylvania really had a new
judicial discipline commission system.
III. Significant but Focused Change: The Substance of the 1993
Amendments
Senator Robert C. Jubelirer described one of the earliest reform
proposals as offering comprehensive judicial reform. 3 Subsequently,
reform proposals narrowed in focus, and supporters fought to maintain
that focus.' °  As a result, the 1993 amendments were limited in
scope, amending only Article V, sections 16 and 18. Within each
section, however, the 1993 amendments made significant changes.
96. No. 1993-56, enacted July 2, 1993, 1993 Pa. Laws 395.
97. PA. CONST. Sched. Art. 5, § 24(a) (adopted 1993).
98. Sharon L. Lynch, New Judicial Discipline Plan Gets Final OK, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg,
Pa.), Aug. 12, 1993, at B10.
99. Appointments Made For Judicial Board, PA. L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 11.
100. John L. Kennedy, New Judicial Discipline Panels Filled, PA. L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at 6;
Peter J. Shelly, Two Boards Appointed on Judicial Misconduct, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.),
Oct. 26, 1993, at B7.
101. Rich Kirkpatrick, New Judicial Board Sworn In, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov.
5, 1993, at B4.
102. Judging Judges, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Nov. 29, 1993, at A6 (editorial).
103. LEGis. J. No. 19-SENATE, 168th General Assembly, 1984 Sess. 1951 (referring to S.
1100, 1983 Sess.).
104. See, e.g., LEGIs. J. No. 4-HousE, 177th General Assembly, 1993 Sess. 65 (debate on an
amendment to add language concerning the retirement system for judicial officers); LEGIS. J. No.
23-SENATE, 173rd General Assembly, 1989 Sess. 424 (debate over an amendment to add language
concerning merit selection); Id. at 419-20 (debate over an amendment to add language changing
"unified judicial system" to "judicial system").
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A. Section 18
The 1993 amendments abolished the JIRB system and replaced it
with a new judicial discipline commission system. The 1993
amendments included some provisions that were similar or identical to
provisions in the 1968 Constitution. Yet, the new system differs from
its predecessor in several important respects, including: (1) the
administrative apparatus for imposing discipline; (2) the process used
to impose discipline; (3) the confidentiality of proceedings; (4) the
applicability of the disciplinary process; (5) the grounds for imposing
discipline; (6) the types of orders allowed in cases involving judicial
misconduct; and (7) the types of orders allowed in cases involving a
disability.
1. Administrative Apparatus-The 1968 Constitution created a
disciplinary commission system in which one agency investigated
complaints, held hearings, and decided whether to recommend
disciplinary sanctions to the Supreme Court.0 5  The 1993
amendments replaced this system with a disciplinary commission
system in which one agency investigates and prosecutes misconduct and
another holds hearings and decides whether to impose disciplinary
sanctions.' °6 The amendments included a number of provisions to
ensure that both of these agencies operate independently of the Supreme
Court.
(a) The 1968 Constitution-The JIRB, which operated as an
independent agency in the Judicial Branch,0 7 was composed of nine
members. The Supreme Court appointed five members: three court of
common pleas judges and two superior court judges; and the governor
appointed four members: two lawyers and two laypersons."'
Members served four-year terms, but the appointing authority could
remove them for cause"0 9 and fill vacancies for the remainder of the
term. The constitution limited membership to four consecutive years,
but members could be reappointed after a lapse of at least one year."'
105. See infra text accompanying notes 107-20.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 122-41.
107. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 555 A.2d 883 (Pa. 1989) (Zappala &
Papadakos, JJ., dissenting); First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 460
A.2d 722 (Pa. 1983) (Nix, J., dissenting).
108. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993). The lawyer members could
not be judges.
109. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
110. Id.
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Former members could continue to sit on the board for hearings that
were in progress at the end of their term."'
JIRB members could not hold office in a political party or political
organization."' In addition, the constitution prohibited JIRB members
from participating in Board proceedings in which they were the subject
of the proceeding.'
Although the JIRB was independent, the constitution did not
empower the Board to establish its own rules of procedure. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court had constitutional authority to promulgate rules of
procedure for the JIRB.
!" 4
(b) Criticisms of the 1968 Constitution-The administrative
apparatus created by the 1968 Constitution was the object of serious
criticism for many reasons.' The presence of five judges on the
nine member JIRB created complaints. Many people questioned
whether judges could effectively review allegations of misconduct by
other judges. 1 6  Thus, the reform movement strove to reduce the
influence of judges on the disciplinary board. 117
Additionally, many people questioned whether the JIRB really was
independent of the Supreme Court. "8 The Court appointed a majority
of JIRB members and retained some administrative authority over the
Board (e.g., the Court promulgated rules of procedure for the JIRB).
Reformers believed that a disciplinary board required independence to
accomplish its work' 9 and sought to reduce the Supreme Court's
influence over the disciplinary board.'20
(c) The 1993 Amendments-The reformers did not achieve all of
their goals with the 1993 amendments but, instead, compromised where
11. Id.
112. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(c) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
113. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(i) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
114. PA. CONST. art. V, § 180) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
115. The list of criticisms presented here, like similar lists presented elsewhere in this article,
is not intended to be comprehensive. Rather, the focus is on those complaints that illustrate the
differences between the 1968 Constitution and the 1993 amendments.
116. See LEGIS. J. No. 47-HousE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1516 (remarks of Rep.
Hagarty). See also Morris Slater, And Justice for All?, PA. L.J.-REP., May 21, 1990, at 2.
117. See LEGis. J. No. 6-HousE, 175th General Assembly, 1991 Sess. 92 (remarks of Rep.
Hagarty).
118. LEGiS. J. No. 47-HOUSE, supra note 116, at 1516 (remarks of Rep. Hagarty).
119. Id. at 1517 (remarks of Rep. Piccola).
120. See, e.g., LEGIS. J. No. 50-SENATE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 2483 (remarks
of Sen. Bortner); LEGIs. J. No. 50-SENATE, 168th General Assembly, 1984 Sess. 2644 (remarks
of Sen. Snyder).
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necessary. In fact, according to one legislator, "the essence of these
amendments is compromise." ' Nevertheless, the 1993 amendments
addressed many criticisms of the 1968 Constitution's administrative
apparatus.
The 1993 amendments created the Judicial Conduct Board (JCB)
in the Judicial Branch. 22  The JCB contains twelve members.
123
The Supreme Court appoints six members: one commonwealth or
superior court judge, one justice of the peace, one lawyer, and three
laypersons; and the Governor appoints six members: one court of
common pleas judge, two lawyers, and three laypersons. 124  To ensure
political balance, no more than one-half of both the Governor's and the
Supreme Court's appointees may belong to the same political party. 25
The 1993 amendments also created the Court of Judicial Discipline
(CJD). 126  Eight members sit on the CJD. The Supreme Court
appoints four members: two judges from the courts of common pleas,
the superior court, or the commonwealth court, one justice of the peace,
and one layperson; and the Governor appoints four members: one judge
from the court of common pleas, the superior court, or the
commonwealth court, two lawyers, and one layperson. 27  As with the
121. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HOUsE, supra note 116, at 1516 (remarks of Rep. Broujos).
122. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a) (adopted 1993).
123. Some legislators opposed the creation of boards with an even number of members. Since
a majority vote is needed for action, they argued that the Supreme Court's appointees could
effectively block disciplinary action. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HousE, supra note 116, at 1516 (remarks
of Rep. Hagarty); Id. at 1517 (remarks of Rep. Piccola). Supporters of even-numbered boards
argued that they ensure that no one branch of government controls the system; disciplinary action
requires a consensus among board members appointed by different branches. Id. at 1.518 (remarks
of Rep. Caltagirone).
124. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(l)-(2) (adopted 1993). The lawyers appointed to the Board
cannot be judges. In addition, the judges appointed to the Board cannot be senior judges. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had appointed senior judges to the JIRB. See Surrick v. Hoffman,
458 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1983) (per curiam) (Nix & McDermott, JJ., dissenting).
The composition of the Board and the Court of Judicial Discipline represents a compromise.
Although one key goal of the reform movement was to reduce the Supreme Court's control of the
disciplinary commission system, a number of legislators opposed proposals that would have given
the Executive Branch authority to appoint a majority of the members of the disciplinary
commissions. For example, one legislator noted that the Executive Branch, like the Judiciary, has
had its share of scandals. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HousE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1518,
1524 (remarks of Rep. McNally). That lawmaker also noted that Senate confirmation of
appointees could result in extended vacancies on the commissions for purely political reasons. Id.
at 1525.
125. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(3) (adopted 1993).
126. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b) (adopted 1993).
127. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(1) (adopted 1993). The lawyers appointed to the court cannot
be judges. In addition, the judges appointed to the court cannot be senior judges.
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JCB, to ensure political balance, no more than one-half of both the
Governor's and the Supreme Court's appointees may belong to the
same political party.'28
The amendments contain similar provisions for members of both
agencies. Members serve four-year terms, although former members of
the CJD continue to sit on the court for hearings in progress at the end
of the term. 2 9 Vacancies are filled for the remainder of the term. 3°
A member cannot serve more than four consecutive years, but can be
reappointed after a lapse of at least one year.
131
Members of the Board and the Court cannot hold office in a
political party or organization.3 2  With the exception of judicial
officers, members cannot hold a compensated public office or
appointment.' Members lose their seats if they attain a position
which would have rendered them ineligible for appointment.' 34 In
addition, judicial officers lose their seats upon termination of the
position that qualified them for appointment."'
The 1993 amendments, unlike the 1968 Constitution, do not
empower the appointing authority to remove a member for cause.
Rather, both agencies have authority to prescribe general rules
governing the conduct of members and may remove a member for a
violation of those rules.
136
The 1993 amendments differ from the 1968 Constitution in
explicitly addressing the potential liability of persons involved in the
disciplinary process. The amendments provide members of the Board,
Unlike the JCB, the CJD is evenly divided between judicial officers and nonjudicial officers.
This may reflect the impact of the new rules on confidentiality. Cf., LEGIS. J. NO. 47-HOUSE,
supra note 124, at 1526 (remarks of Rep. McHale and Rep. Picolla) (arguing that Supreme Court
appointees were less likely to "manipulate" this part of the disciplinary process because the public
could view the proceedings). It may also reflect a compromise; although many reformers wanted
to reduce the influence of judges on the disciplinary commissions, some legislators believed that
the boards which review the conduct of judges should be composed primarily of judges. LEGIs.
J. No. 49-SENATE, 172nd General Assembly, 1988 Sess. 2500 (remarks of Sen. Zemprelli). For
example, some legislators argued that the judicial disciplinary commission should be similar to the
licensing boards in the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, which are composed
largely of persons from the same profession as the person subject to disciplinary proceedings. See
id. at 2501 (remarks of Sen. Afflerbach).
128. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(2) (adopted 1993).
129. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(3), (b)(2) (adopted 1993).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(4), (b)(3) (adopted 1993).
133. Id.
134. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(3), (b)(2) (adopted 1993).
135. Id.
136. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(5), (b)(3) (adopted 1993).
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the court, and the staffs of both agencies with absolute immunity from
suit for all conduct in the course of their official duties.137  The
amendments also state that "no civil action or disciplinary complaint
predicated upon the filing of a complaint or other d6cuments with the
board or testimony before the board may be maintained against any
complainant, witness or counsel."'38  Moreover, the new section 18
provides that "no civil action or disciplinary complaint predicated on
testimony before the [CJD] may be maintained against any witness or
counsel.' 39
The 1993 amendments also contain a number of provisions
intended to ensure that both the Board and the CJD act more
independently of the Supreme Court than did the JIRB.140  Each
agency has the authority to appoint its own staff, prepare and administer
its own budget (which is to be a separate line item in the budget request
of the Judicial Branch), adopt rules of procedure, and take other actions
necessary to ensure its efficient operation. 
1 4'
2. The Disciplinary Process-The 1993 amendments change the
disciplinary process in part because of alterations in the administrative
apparatus. The amendments introduced innovations at every stage of
the process, from the investigation of complaints to the judicial review
of disciplinary decisions.
137. PA. CONST. art V, § 18(a)(10), (b)(6) (adopted 1993).
138. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(10) (adopted 1993).
139. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(6) (adopted 1993).
140. The 1993 amendments reduce the Supreme Court's authority with respect to the judicial
discipline commission system, but do not change the Court's authority with respect to attorney
discipline. In some states, judges may be disciplined qua attorneys and removed from the bench.
See REFERENCE MANUAL No. 5, supra note 2, at 170-71. Under Pennsylvania's 1968
Constitution, the Disciplinary Board could not take action against an attorney for misconduct that
occurred while the attorney was a judicial officer. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous
Attorney A., 595 A.2d 42 (Pa. 1991) (Papadakos, J., dissenting). Whether the 1993 amendments
will lead the Court to reconsider the Disciplinary Board's authority is questionable.
A similar question can be raised about the 1993 amendments' impact on the Supreme
Court's authority to impose discipline. Some decisions suggest that the Supreme Court has
authority to discipline judicial officers under the general supervisory and administrative authority
granted in Article V, sections 1 and 10, or under its King's Bench powers. See, e.g., Fink v.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 654 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Pa. 1987); In re Franciscus, 369 A.2d
1190 (Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870 (1977). But see Petition of Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n,
460 A.2d 721, 722 (Pa. 1983) (per curiam) (Hutchinson, J., concurring). For a discussion of this
issue prior to the adoption of the 1968 Constitution, see REFERENCE MANUAL NO. 5, supra note
2, at 167-70. If the Supreme Court can impose discipline outside of the judicial discipline
commission system, the 1993 amendments will have a much different impact than they would if
the Court can only discipline judicial officers using the procedure outlined in section 18.
141. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1g(a)(6), (b)(4) (adopted 1993).
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1994
(a) The 1968 Constitution-The JIRB performed many tasks under
the 1968 Constitution: it received and initiated complaints, conducted
investigations, 42  held hearings when necessary, 1' and, when it
found "good cause," recommended disciplinary action to the Supreme
Court.' The Board, however, could not impose disciplinary
sanctions - not even informal sanctions.
45
The Supreme Court lacked the authority to review a JIRB decision
which did not recommend disciplinary measures. If the Board did
recommend sanctions, however, the Court reviewed "de novo the record
of the Board to determine whether the charges [were] established by
clear and convincing evidence." 46  The Court reviewed the record on
the law and the facts and could permit the introduction of additional
evidence. 47  The Court could approve the JIRB's recommendation,
modify it, or reject it entirely. 48  While the Supreme Court could
reconsider its own decision, 149 no other state court could review a
disciplinary order of the Supreme Court. 5 '
(b) Criticisms of the 1968 Constitution-Some observers criticized
the disciplinary process created in 1968 because the JIRB performed
multiple roles. For example, some witnesses before the Beck
Commission complained that a single agency was responsible for
investigating complaints, holding hearings, and recommending
disciplinary sanctions.' Such a disciplinary system at least appeared
unfair to jurists.'52 This system also produced delays, partly because
142. PA. CONST. art V, § 18(e) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
143. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(f) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
144. PA CONST. art. V, § 18(g) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993). The court in Keiser v. Bell,
332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rejected a claim that the JIRB system unconstitutionally
commingled prosecutory and adjudicatory functions.
145. The Board could not even give informal warnings. In re XYP, 567 A.2d 1036 (Pa.
1989). See also Lisa Brennan, Judicial Review Board Lacks Sanctioning Power, PA. L.J.-REP.,
Jan. 8, 1990, at 9.
146. Matter of Braig, 554 A.2d 493, 495 (Pa. 1989) (note omitted).
147. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(h) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
148. Id.
149. See In re Greenberg, 318 A.2d 740 (Pa. 1974) (vacating a suspension).
150. Decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could be appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. In addition, some disciplinary cases resulted in lawsuits in the lower federal
courts. See, e.g., White v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 744 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Fink
v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 651 F. Supp. 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Keiser v. Bell, 332 F.
Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
151. In testimony before the Beck Commission, even JIRB members expressed concern about
the multiple roles of the Board. BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 89.
152. Id. at 89-90.
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the JIRB had to investigate and adjudicate cases with inadequate staff
assistance. '53
Other observers expressed concern about the Supreme Court's role
in the process. The Court's de novo review of recommendations
produced delays.'54 Moreover, the Court "impose[d] punishment on
errant judges which [was] totally different from that recommended by
the people who [had] actually heard the evidence."'
' 55
Reformers wanted to change the disciplinary process to address
these concerns. They had to act cautiously, however, because they
knew that a disciplinary board with too much power and independence
may threaten judicial independence.'56 Thus, the 1993 amendments
represented an attempt to promote judicial accountability without
threatening judicial independence.' 57
(c) The 1993 Amendments-The Judicial Conduct Board serves as
an investigatory/prosecutory agency. It receives and investigates
complaints and may initiate investigations on its own initiative.
158
The Board then determines whether there is probable cause to file
formal charges against a judicial officer.'59 The subject of the
proceeding must be informed about the investigation and must be given
an opportunity to respond before the JCB ascertains the presence of
probable cause to file formal charges. 6 °
If the Board does not find probable cause, it may issue a statement
about the case to the complainant or the subject of the proceeding.'6 '
153. Id. at 107. The Fink case showed that JIRB proceedings could take a long time. In that
case, more than four years passed from the date the complaint was filed to the date the JIRB
recommended removal. Andrew S. Ross, JIRB Seeks Dismissal of Judge Fink, PA. L.J.-REP., Mar.
9, 1987, at 1.
154. BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 90. The Snyder case showed that
disciplinary proceedings could take a long time at the Supreme Court level. In that case, almost
two years passed from the date of the JIRB recommendation of removal to the date of the Supreme
Court's decision. Snyder v. Commonwealth State Employes' Retirement Bd., 562 A.2d 1000 (Pa.
1989), rev'd, 621 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1993) (per curiam). See also Supreme Ct. Bars Ex-judge from
Further Judicial Office, PA. L.-REP., Mar. 30, 1987, at 9.
155. LEGIS. J. No. 50-SENATE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 2483 (remarks of Sen.
Bortner).
156. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HouSE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1519 (remarks of Rep.
Broujos).
157. Id. at 1515 (remarks ofRep. Broujos).
158. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(7) (adopted 1993).
159. Id.
160. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(8) (adopted 1993).
161. Id. This statement may contain the identity of the complainant, the identity of the subject
of the complaint, the contents and nature of the complaint, the actions taken in the conduct of the
investigation and the results and conclusions of the investigation. The Board can also send a copy
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If it does find probable cause, the Board becomes responsible for
prosecuting the jurist before the CJD. 162  If the Board finds probable
cause to file formal charges concerning physical or mental disability,
the Board must notify the subject of the proceedings and provide "an
opportunity to resign from judicial office or, when appropriate, to enter
a rehabilitation program prior to the filing of the formal charges with
the CJD."'
63
The CJD makes up the adjudicatory arm of the new disciplinary
commission system, acting as a court of record with all the attendant
powers and duties.' 4 Unlike the JIRB, the court decides whether to
impose disciplinary sanctions. 65  To overcome the presumption of
innocence, the Board has the burden of proving the charges by clear
and convincing evidence. 166  All decisions of the CJD must contain
written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
167
The 1993 amendments allow appeals of disciplinary decisions to
state courts. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court hears appeals of judges
and district justices. 6  A special tribunal composed of seven judges
(other than senior judges), chosen from among the judges of the
superior and commonwealth courts who do not sit on the JCB or the
CJD, presides over the appeal of a Pennsylvania Supreme Court
justice. 69  Legislators created the special tribunal because they
doubted the effectiveness and objectivity of a system in which Supreme
Court justices adjudicate one of their peers. 7 '
Both the Supreme Court and the special tribunal play the same
role. Both judicial bodies function like an appellate court, reviewing
the record of the CJD proceedings rather than considering the case de
novo. 171
of information or evidence acquired in the course of the investigation.
162. PA. CONST. art. V, §.18(a)(7) (adopted 1993).
163. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(9) (adopted 1993). Presumably, entering a rehabilitation
program would not necessarily preclude disciplinary action.




168. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(c)(1) (adopted 1993).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., LEGIS. 1. No. I-SENATE, 177th General Assembly, 1993 Sess. 207 (remarks of
Sen. Greenleaf).
171. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(c)(2) (adopted 1993). This provision states:
On appeal, the Supreme Court or special tribunal shall review the record of the
proceedings of the [CJD] as follows: on the law, the scope of review is plenary; on the
facts, the scope of review is clearly erroneous; and, as to sanctions, the scope of review
is whether the sanctions imposed were lawful. The Supreme Court or special tribunal
PENNSYLVANIA'S JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SYSTEM
The 1993 amendments also provide for judicial review of the
disciplinary commission's failure to discipline a judicial officer. The
JCB may appeal such a decision to the Supreme Court or the special
tribunal, as appropriate, but this appeal may only address questions of
law. 172
According to the 1993 amendments, a jurist who is the
complainant, the subject of the complaint, a party, or a witness, is
prohibited from participating as a member of the JCB, the CJD, the
Supreme Court, or the special tribunal.' The 1968 Constitution only
prohibited a judicial officer who was the subject of the complaint from
participating on the JIRB or the Supreme Court.1
74
3. Confidentiality--The 1968 Constitution strictly limited public
information about disciplinary proceedings unless and until the JIRB
recommended disciplinary action. The 1993 amendments opened the
disciplinary process to greater public scrutiny.
(a) The 1968 Constitution-The 1968 version of section 18 stated
that "all papers filed with and proceedings before the [JIRB] shall be
confidential but upon being filed by the board in the Supreme Court, the
record shall lose its confidential character. The filing of papers with
and the giving of testimony before the board shall be privileged."'
' 75
The JIRB originally filed the records of all cases with the Supreme
Court, regardless of whether the Board recommended disciplinary
action. The Board changed its practice in 1983, only filing the record
in cases where it recommended disciplinary sanctions.'76 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld this practice in
First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.
17
may revise or reject an order of the court upon a determination that the order did not
sustain this standard of review; otherwise, the Supreme Court or special tribunal shall
affirm the order of the court.
Id.
172. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(c)(3) (adopted 1993).
173. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(c)(4) (adopted 1993).
174. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(i) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
175. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(h) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993). For a scholarly analysis of
the arguments for and against strict confidentiality rules in the disciplinary process, see Jeffrey M.
Shaman & Yvette Begue, Silence Isn't Always Golden: Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial
Disciplinary Process, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 755 (1985).
176. First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 579 F. Supp. 192, 197-98
(E.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Adams, Gibbons, Sloviter &
Mansmann, JJ., concurring and dissenting in part).
177. Id.
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Consequently, if the JIRB did not recommend disciplinary sanctions, its
papers and proceedings remained confidential. 78
(b) Criticisms of the 1968 Constitution-Perhaps the most severe
criticism of the JIRB system resulted from the strict rules on
confidentiality. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed concern
about the potential for abuse, noting that the rules on confidentiality
could allow the Board to harass and intimidate justices and judges.'79
Few legislators, however, feared that the rules on confidentiality
shielded an overly-aggressive Board from public view. Instead, they
feared that misconduct was being swept under the rug. 80
Consequently, reducing the secrecy of JIRB proceedings became one of
the key goals of the reform movement.'8
(c) The 1993 Amendments-Complaints filed with or initiated by
the JCB, statements, documents, and other information or evidence
acquired in the course of an investigation do not constitute public
information.82  Unless the subject of the proceeding waives
confidentiality, Board proceedings remain confidential.8 3
If, independent of any Board action, the public becomes aware of
a Board investigation, the subject of the proceeding may direct the JCB
to issue a statement "to confirm that the investigation is in progress, to
clarify the procedural aspects of the proceedings, to explain the rights
of the subject of the investigation to a fair hearing without prejudgment
or to provide the response of the subject of the investigation to the
complaint."'8 4  This provision solved a problem that the JIRB faced
under the 1968 Constitution: the strict rules on confidentiality
178. The courts rejected attempts to obtain access to JIRB records. See, e.g., In re Subpoena
on Judicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 517 A.2d 949 (Pa. 1986). The courts also refused to make
JIRB proceedings and records public. See, e.g., Application of Surrick, 470 A.2d 447 (Pa. 1983).
See also Bonnie S. Greenberg, Pennsylvania Constitution Prohibits State Supreme Court from
Compelling Production of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board's Confidential Records, 57 TEMP.
L.Q. 407 (1984).
179. In re Chiovero, 570 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1990).
180. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HOUSE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1517 (remarks of Rep.
Piccola).
181. LEGIS. J. No. 4-HOUsE, 177th General Assembly, 1993 Sess. 62 (remarks of Rep.
Piccola); LEGIs. J. No. 50-SENATE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 2481 (remarks of Sen.
Greenleaf).
182. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(a)(8) (adopted 1993).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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prevented the JIRB from responding to statements about a proceeding.
This restriction even applied to misleading or inaccurate statements. 185
Thus, the 1993 amendments set forth exceptions to the general rule
which keeps proceedings confidential until the filing of formal charges
with the Court of Judicial Discipline. After the filing of charges, the
1993 amendments provide for public access to the disciplinary process.
Formal charges constitute matters of public record," 6 and all hearings
before the court constitute public proceedings.'87
4. Applicability of the Disciplinary Commission System-The 1968
Constitution created a judicial discipline commission system to address
the misconduct and disability of justices and judges. That constitution
also empowered the Supreme Court to "prescribe rules of procedure for
the suspension, removal, discipline and compulsory retirement of
justices of the peace."188  Thus, "[tihe Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board [had] no constitutional jurisdiction over justices of the
peace .... The procedure as to justices of the peace [was] based
solely on rules of the Supreme Court which [were] subject to change by
that court."' 9
The 1993 amendments created a judicial discipline commission
system that applies to justices of the peace as well as to justices and
judges.' 90  Many reform bills included language to make the
disciplinary commission system apply to justices of the peace as well
as to justices and judges,'9 ' but the legislative debates rarely mention
this proposal. The Beck Commission report similarly endorsed the idea
with little discussion. 92 The minimal discussion of this issue may
indicate that the overwhelming consensus of opinion favored having one
judicial discipline commission system that applies to all judicial
officers.
185. BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 101.
186. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(5) (adopted 1993).
187. Id.
188. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(k) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993). In fact, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules that made justices of the peace subject to the JIRB system. See, e.g., Rules of
Procedure Governing the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board, Rule 23 (defining "judge" as
including justices of the peace).
189. WOODSIDE, supra note 2, at 439.
190. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(l) (adopted 1993) (specifying the reasons for which
a justice, judge, or justice of the peace may be disciplined under section 18).
191. See, e.g., S. 1000, 1991 Sess.; H.R. 1, 1991 Sess.; S. 1, 1989 Sess.; H.R. 539, 1989 Sess.;
S. 1399, 1988 Sess.; S. 1, 1987 Sess.; S. 1, 1985 Sess.; H.R. 489, 1985 Sess.; H.R. 846, 1983 Sess.
192. BECK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 44, at 83.
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5. Grounds for Imposing Disciplinary Sanctions-The 1968
version of Article V, section 18 provided that a justice or judge could
be suspended, or removed from office, or otherwise disciplined for: (1)
misconduct in office; (2) neglect of duty; (3) failure to perform his
duties; (4) conduct which prejudices the proper administration of justice
or brings the judicial office into disrepute; or (5) violations of Article
V, section 17.93
In the Dalessandro case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
the constitution and the Canons of Judicial Ethics only apply to: (1) a
judge's conduct in an official capacity; (2) other conduct that affects the
judge while acting in an official capacity; and (3) conduct prohibited by
law. 194  That decision was one of the first which attracted legislative
interest in judicial discipline.' 95 Therefore, one of the earliest goals
of the reform movement was to alter the grounds for imposing judicial
discipline. 196
The 1993 amendments effectively reverse the Dalessandro decision
by stating that one reason for imposing discipline on a judicial officer
is "conduct which prejudices the proper administration of justice or
brings the judicial office into disrepute, whether or not the conduct
193. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993). Article V, section 17
provided:
(a) Justices and judges shall devote full time to their judicial duties, and shall not
engage in the practice of law, hold office in a political party or political organization,
or hold an office or position of profit in the government of the United States, the
Commonwealth or any municipal corporation or political subdivision thereof, except in
the armed service of the United States or the Commonwealth.
(b) Justices and judges shall not engage in any activity prohibited by law and shall
not violate any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Justices of the peace shall be governed by rules or canons which shall be prescribed by
the Supreme Court.
(c) No justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be paid or accept for the
performance of any judicial duty or for any service connected with his office, any fee,
emolument or perquisite other than the salary and expenses provided by law.
(d) No duties shall be imposed by law upon the Supreme Court or any of the
justices thereof or the Superior Court or any of the judges thereof, except such as are
judicial, nor shall any of them exercise any power of appointment except as provided
in this Constitution.
Id. The 1993 amendments did not change this section.
194. Matter of Dalessandro, 397 A.2d 743 (Pa. 1979) (per curiam).
195. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
196. Two reform bills from the 1983-1984 legislative session included language to reverse this
decision. S. 1100, 1983 Sess.; H.R. 1996, 1984 Sess. Such language was common in reform bills
by the 1985-1986 session. See S. 1, 1985 Sess.; S. 842, 1985 Sess.; H.R. 260, 1985 Sess.; H.R.
489, 1985 Sess.; H.R. 2451, 1986 Sess.
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occurred while acting in a judicial capacity or is prohibited by
law."
197
In addition to reversing the Dalessandro decision, the 1993
amendments greatly expand the constitutional grounds for imposing
discipline on justices of the peace. Section 18's list of reasons for
imposing discipline, which formerly applied only to justices and judges,
now applies to justices of the peace as well.' 98 The 1993 amendments
also specify new grounds for imposing discipline under section 18. The
constitution now specifically states that a judicial officer who receives
a conviction for a felony or for conduct that violates a canon or rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court is subject to disciplinary
measures. 1
9 9
6. Orders in Cases Involving Judicial Misconduct-The 1968
Constitution listed the types of disciplinary orders that the Supreme
Court could issue against a justice or judge engaged in misconduct.
That constitution, however, failed to specify the types of orders that the
Court could issue while charges were pending against a justice or judge.
The 1993 amendments list additional options for the Court of Judicial
Discipline, both before and after finding that a jurist has engaged in
misconduct.
(a) The 1968 Constitution-The Supreme Court had authority to
suspend, remove, or otherwise discipline2 0 a judicial officer who
engaged in misconduct.2"' An order of suspension or removal carried
with it an immediate loss of salary.2"2 In addition, an order of
removal resulted in a permanent ban on holding judicial office.20 3
While a suspension order could require the forfeiture of office, it did
not permanently bar the individual from holding judicial office.2 "4
(b) Criticisms of the 1968 Constitution-The Supreme Court
promulgated rules in 1986 for the emergency suspension of justices and
197. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(1) (adopted 1993).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Other forms of discipline included reprimanding the judicial officer, see Matter of Larsen,
616 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 65 (1993), and, possibly, limiting
the jurist's activities. See In re Greenberg, 280 A.2d 370 (Pa. 1971), vacated, 318 A.2d 740 (Pa.
1974) (Eagen & Pomeroy, JJ., dissenting) (rather than suspending a judge, three justices believed
that he should have been limited to administrative functions and voluntary settlement conferences).
201. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
202. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(h) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
203. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(1) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
204. Matter of Cunningham, 538 A.2d 473 (Pa. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805 (1988).
98 DICKINSoN LAW REVIEW SPRING 1994
judges." 5  Under these rules, the judicial officer received full salary
during the suspension.
Many people objected to paying the salaries of suspended justices
and judges under such circumstances.2"6 For example, one editorial
likened a paid suspension to a vacation.2 7  The public outcry
following the Roofers Union scandal decided the legislative battle over
this issue.208  That scandal caused fifteen Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas judges to be suspended with pay for more than six
months.
(c) The 1993 Amendments-The 1993 amendments empower the
CJD to order removal from office, suspension with or without pay,
censure, or other discipline if the CJD finds a jurist engaged in
misconduct.20 9 If the court orders suspension or removal, that order
takes effect immediately; the judicial officer loses his or her office and
salary prior to an appeal before the Supreme Court or the special
tribunal.2"'
Additionally, the 1993 amendments grant the Court of Judicial
Discipline constitutional authority to order the interim suspension of a
judicial officer "against whom formal charges have been filed with the
[CJD] by the board or against whom has been filed an indictment or
205. 16 Pa. Bull. 4950 (1986). The Supreme Court promulgated new rules of procedure for
the JIRB in late 1992. 22 Pa. Bull. 5592 (1992). According to the JIRB's executive director,
these new rules demonstrated the willingness of the JIRB and the court to respond to criticisms
while still staying within the bounds set by the 1968 Constitution. John L. Kennedy, Judicial
Discipline Changes Unlikely to Alter Legislation, PA. L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 6.
An alternative to suspension was to limit the judge's activities while a disciplinary case was
pending. For example, the Court could assign judges to administrative and other non-judicial
duties until disciplinary actions were resolved. See Fink v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 651
F. Supp. 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
206. LEGIS. J. No. 25-SENATE, 171st General Assembly, 1987 Sess. 355 (remarks of Sen.
Bell).
207. Andrew S. Ross, Suspend Pay of Suspended Judges, PA. L.J.-REP., Feb. 16, 1987, at 2
(editorial).
208. Judicial Reform: Senate Approves Amendment, PA. L.J.-REP., April 13, 1987, at 1. See
also LEGiS. J. No. 25-SENATE, 171st General Assembly, 1987 Sess. 355 (remarks of Sen. Bell)
("we do have in one part of Pennsylvania some fifteen judges who have not been working for six
months who are still getting pay, and my people in my county are in revolt against such an idea.").
209. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(b)(5) (adopted 1993).
210. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(1) (adopted 1993). This provision raises a host of interesting
questions. For example, if a removal decision is reversed on appeal, should the judge be
compensated for the period he or she was suspended? How is that period treated for retirement
purposes? Does the governor have authority to fill the vacant position on the bench while an
appeal is pending? The courts will need to answer these questions, since the 1993 amendments
do not do so explicitly.
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information charging a felony." '' This authority explicitly includes
the authority to suspend a judicial officer without pay. Interim
suspension orders are not appealable.l 3
7. Orders in Cases Involving a Disability-In addition to its use
in cases involving judicial misconduct, the JIRB system applied to cases
involving physically or mentally disabled justices or judges. The
Supreme Court could order a justice or judge "[to retire] for disability
seriously interfering with the performance of his duties. 214
The 1993 amendments articulate a wide range of options available
to the CJD in cases involving a disabled justice, judge, or justice of the
peace. The court may order the judicial officer's removal, suspension,
or retirement" 5 or impose "other limitations on the activities" of the
judicial officer.2 6
8. Provisions that Remain Virtually Unchanged-The 1993
amendments include several important provisions found in the 1968
version of section 18. The new section 18 states that "a justice, judge
or justice of the peace convicted of misbehavior in office by a court,
disbarred as a member of the bar of the Supreme Court or removed
under this section shall forfeit automatically his judicial office and
thereafter be ineligible for judicial office., 217  The 1968 Constitution
included virtually identical language.21 8
The new section 18, also like the 1968 version, provides for the
automatic forfeiture of judicial office if a justice or judge files for
nomination or election to any public office other than a judicial
office.219  The 1993 amendments, however, extend this provision to
justices of the peace. 22o
Finally, the 1993 amendments parallel the 1968 Constitution in that
both versions explicitly state that the judicial discipline commission
211. PA. CONST. art V, § 18(d)(2) (adopted 1993).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
215. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(1) (adopted 1993).
216. Id.
217. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(3) (adopted 1993).
218. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(l) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993).
219. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(m) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993); PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(4)
(adopted 1993).
220. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(4) (adopted 1993).
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system acts as an addition to, rather than a substitute for,
impeachment.22'
B. Section 16
The 1968 version of Article V, section 16, relating to compensation
and retirement of justices, judges, and justices of the peace, contained
one sentence addressing the compensation of removed and suspended
judicial officers. Specifically, section 16(b) stated that "[n]o
compensation shall be paid to any justice, judge or justice of the peace
who is suspended or removed from office under section eighteen of this
article or under article six. ' '222 This provision became the subject of
extensive litigation during the 1980s as the State Employes' Retirement
Board denied retirement benefits to judges who were removed or
suspended. This litigation culminated in Glancey v. Commonwealth
State Employes' Retirement Board,223 in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that suspended or removed judicial officers do not
automatically lose their pension benefits. According to the Court,
... it was not intended that this Court should strip a judge of
retirement benefits each time it imposes removal under the JIRB
provisions, without any regard for the nature or severity of the
conduct at issue .... Given the need for flexibility and case-by-
case options in the realm of sanctioning judges, the Constitution
wisely leaves the distinct issue of pension forfeiture to the
legislative branch.224
Representative David W. Heckler introduced an amendment
specifically designed to respond to the Glancey decision. 225 Although
he believed that the language in the 1968 Constitution was clear, he also
believed that the Court had legitimate concerns; given the severity of
losing pension benefits, that sanction should not automatically take
effect upon the suspension or removal of a judicial officer. 226 The
1993 amendments included Representative Heckler's amendment which
specifies the type of conduct that merits this severe sanction.
221. PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(n) (adopted 1968, repealed 1993); PA. CONST. art. V, § 18(d)(5)
(adopted 1993).
222. PA. CONST. art. V, § 16(b) (adopted 1968, amended 1993). Article VI provides for the
impeachment of judicial officers. See supra note 2.
223. 610 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1992).
224. Id. at 26 (note and emphasis omitted).
225. LEGIS. J. No. 47-HousE, 176th General Assembly, 1992 Sess. 1522.
226. Id.
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The 1993 amendments repealed and replaced the relevant sentence
in section 16(b). The section now states that, except as provided by
law, a judicial officer shall not receive any salary, retirement benefit, or
other compensation upon suspension, removal, or bar from holding
office for specified reasons.227 Those reasons include: (1) conviction
of a felony; (2) misconduct in office; or (3) conduct which prejudices
the proper administration of justice or brings the judicial office into
disrepute.22 This provision applies when either the impeachment




In May 1993, Pennsylvania's voters approved constitutional
amendments concerning judicial discipline. Those amendments made
significant changes in the state's judicial discipline commission system,
yet they should not be viewed as a major break with the past. Rather,
they should be viewed as steps in the evolutionary process.
Pennsylvania has long had several formal and informal methods of
imposing discipline on judicial officers. The Constitution of 1968
created a judicial discipline commission system in response to the
shortcomings of earlier disciplinary devices. Over time, however,
people began to believe that the disciplinary commission system created
in 1968 had its own shortcomings. Judges formed a majority on the
commission. A single commission investigated complaints, held
hearings, and recommended discipline. Commission proceedings were
covered by a veil of secrecy. The criticisms of the JIRB system went
on and on.
The 1993 amendments attempted to address the shortcomings of
the previous system. The amendments did not discard the judicial
discipline commission system, they adapted it to better suit the unique
environment of Pennsylvania state government. Viewed from this
perspective, the extinction of the JIRB and the appearance of the JCB
and CJD are simply links in the evolutionary chain.
Pennsylvania's judicial discipline system will probably continue to
evolve in the future. The 1993 amendments, after all, were a
compromise; they did not create a perfect system, but they were the
most that was politically possible at the time.23 Those amendments
227. PA. CONST. art. V, § 16(b) (amended 1993).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See LEGIS. J. No. 4-HOUSE, 177th General Assembly, 1993 Sess. 63 (remarks of Rep.
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no doubt represent a significant step forward, but they probably do not
represent the final word on judicial discipline in Pennsylvania.
Kukovich).
